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ABSTRACT
Network Management is a critical process for an enterprise to configure and moni-
tor the network devices using cost effective methods. It is imperative for it to be
robust and free from adversarial or accidental security flaws. With the advent of
cloud computing and increasing demands for centralized network control, conventional
management protocols like Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) appear
inadequate and newer techniques like Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA) design and Network Configuration (NETCONF) have been invented. How-
ever, unlike SNMP which underwent improvements concentrating on security, the new
data management and storage techniques have not been scrutinized for the inherent
security flaws.
In this thesis, I identify several vulnerabilities in the widely used critical infras-
tructures which leverage the NMDA design. Software Defined Networking (SDN),
a proponent of NMDA, heavily relies on its datastores to program and manage the
network. I base my research on the security challenges put forth by the existing
datastore’s design as implemented by the SDN controllers. The vulnerabilities iden-
tified in this work have a direct impact on the controllers like OpenDayLight, Open
Network Operating System and their proprietary implementations (by CISCO, Er-
icsson, RedHat, Brocade, Juniper, etc). Using the threat detection methodology, I
demonstrate how the NMDA-based implementations are vulnerable to attacks which
compromise availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the network. I finally propose
defense measures to address the security threats in the existing design and discuss
the challenges faced while employing these countermeasures.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
We live our lives on the Internet. Our entertainment, financial, social, and inti-
mate interactions are increasingly happening online, manifesting as bits racing from
network to network across the world. Though, most of the time, the technical de-
tails of the configuration of these networks are “out of sight and out of mind“, the
networks must be configured and maintained. Traditionally, this has been a painstak-
ing process involving manual configuration of individual devices across the network
topology. Recently, however, this has begun to be revolutionized by Software Defined
Networking (SDN).
SDN is an innovative architectural approach to modern computer networks where
the control features of the infrastructure are abstracted from the network devices
themselves and placed into a centralized location. This abstraction of the network al-
lows for novel approaches to network management, including third-party applications,
dynamic and adaptive configuration, and cloud-hosting. Many organizations are real-
izing the benefit of SDN: Google’s SDN-based network increased network utilization
in their WAN to 100% [13].
However, this applicability comes with some risk: as SDN technology is used
to configure, monitor, and manage computer networks, their security is of vital im-
portance. Attacks against an SDN system can bypass access controls, take down
the network, reroute traffic, or even man-in-the-middle communication. Therefore,
the security of an SDN system is of the utmost importance. Naturally, security re-
searchers have investigated the security of these networks, identifying issues stemming
from the malicious applications [26], vulnerable services [12], network configuration
1
flooding [31, 33], link saturation [15], and so on.
Through our research into SDN security, we observed a central theme shared
by many of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, Software Defined Networking suffers
from a semantic gap problem in the way that data is shared between the centralized
controller and the distributed network devices. This semantic gap leads to differences
in the treatment of data by different subcomponents of a software defined network,
potentially manifesting in security problems.
More interestingly, a deeper look revealed that this semantic gap problem is not,
in fact, solely the fault of SDN’s design decisions, but rather is inherent in the modern
standard for network management data storage architecture (RFC 8342)—the Net-
work Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) design [28]—used by SDN and
many other network configuration systems. NMDA specifies that management, con-
figuration, and operational information that is required and generated during the life
cycle of SDN controllers are stored in entities termed datastores. Different states and
stages which appear during the control flow of an event govern which datastores will
be used to hold specific information and what entities are responsible for processing
it.
The NMDA RFC recognizes that its distributed architecture could open the door
to security concerns, but ultimately states in its Security Considerations section that
the design has “no security impact on the network (Internet).” We showcase that this
is not the case: different datastore entities and SDN layers are governed by diverse
semantics, and the intercommunication between these entities can lead to a breach of
trust boundaries in two forms. First, although continuous flow of information happens
between SDN planes, there is no proposed mechanism to verify the integrity and
amount of data that flows between the layers. Second, applications use and modify
information in datastores without a sense of ownership, which leads to conflicting
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responsibilities and loss of integrity of this information.
In this paper, we investigated the security of SDN in the context of this design
issue, identified multiple security vulnerabilities stemming from the semantic gap.
These vulnerabilities impact widely-used, enterprise-ready SDN controllers: Open-
DayLight (ODL) [25], Open Network Operating System (ONOS) [24], and their pro-
prietary implementations by vendors such as Juniper, Ericsson, CISCO and RedHat.
We disclosed these vulnerabilities to the impacted vendors as we discovered them,
and the vendors confirmed the identified vulnerabilities, resulting in three CVEs and
a confirmed security issue with no CVE yet assigned. Additionally, we worked with
the concerned engineering teams to design countermeasures and assisted in identify-
ing their implementation-level root causes bugs to help fix the software itself, where
possible. Because the issues that we identified stemmed from design inadequacies,
some of them could not be fixed under the current SDN controller design without
incurring significant performance penalties. Inspired by this, we identified a number
of mitigations that can be applied to the NMDA specification (and, subsequently,
propagated into SDN designs) to address this semantic gap.
The key contributions of this work can be summarized as:
1. At the time of the writing, this work is the first security analysis of the under-
lying design of SDN datastores, and we determine that there exists a semantic
gap in information management between different layers of abstraction in SDN.
We examine the problems that stem from this semantic gap and identify ways
to leverage it to adversely impact decisions of services running inside an SDN
controller. Due to the event-driven nature of SDN, this can have a cascading
effect on the security of the entire network.
2. We present an adversarial model and threat detection methodology (using an
3
approach assisted by black box fuzzing) to selectively attack different datastores.
With this, we identify vulnerabilities (with corresponding exploits) in widely
adopted SDN controllers.
3. We propose potential countermeasures to prevent the exploits that lead to at-
tacks such as denial of service, privilege escalation, integrity breach, etc.
Although this work focuses on security issues in SDN (a major application of the
NMDA standard), the applications of the vulnerable network management datastore
design are not limited to SDN controllers (as shown in Table 6.1). Therefore, vulner-
abilities exposed in this work can potentially be extrapolated to other NMDA-based
network management platforms.
4
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the fundamental concepts involved in network manage-
ment, SDN, and organization of the stored information inside SDN controllers which
result in the semantic gap problem.
2.1 Network Management
A network is composed of multiple entities (switches, routers, links, hosts, etc.)
which can be individually managed and programmed with forwarding logic. How-
ever, individually managing these entities increases the degree of management for the
entire network which in turn increases its cost of maintenance. The Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) marked the beginning of remote monitoring and
configuration of management devices. The first draft of SNMP appeared in 1988 [4]
has since undergone multiple amendments. At its prime, however, SNMP started to
appear redundant and unsuitable to manage dynamically scalable networks. SNMP
automation scripts are costly and fragile to maintain (e.g., CISCO IOS scripts) as
they lack API-based programming benefits or support for transaction management.
The next generation of network management is represented by model-driven archi-
tectures that work with dynamically scaling systems such as cloud and data centers.
These architectures provide APIs and models to describe not just the network ele-
ments, but also the policies, services, and transactions in a network. Some of these
new protocols, which are quickly gaining popularity, include RESTCONF [3], NET-
CONF [6], and OpenFlow [21].
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2.2 Rise in Adoption of NMDA with SDN
The Network Management Datastore Design (NMDA) [28] and the Network
Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [6] were introduced to address the challenges
of portability of systems and maintenance cost in SNMP respectively. However, they
suffered from lack of early adoption as their adoption required a massive change in
the architecture of existing systems and rewriting of automation frameworks.
With the introduction of Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV), the merits of centralized network programming were real-
ized and adoption of API-based protocols and modular design started to gain momen-
tum. A recent report on NMDA’s current state of affairs documents an exponential
growth in the number of NMDA-based models [1].
The SDN architecture obsoletes SNMP constructs and necessitates the adoption of
modeled datastores design. The configuration settings stored inside an SDN-controller
are transferred to infrastructure (in SDN terminology, this is a movement of infor-
mation to different physical and logical planes) and it is possible to miss a part or
whole of the information during communication if a principled design is not followed.
Therefore, SDN leverages NMDA to define a set of abstracted datastores which keep
conceptual data in separate places (datastores) as shown in Figure 2.1.
In addition to configuration and operational datastores of NMDA, vendors that
implement SDN controllers also add a third datastore for storing the management
information (such as network administrator credentials, authorized applications, etc.).
Information categorization is explained in further details in Section 2.4.
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Figure 2.1: The constitution of SDN: Applications store network configuration in
controller, controller configures the network and provides operational state back to
applications
2.3 SDN
In SDN, remote applications configure a centralized server (running multiple ser-
vices) to manage a physically separated networking infrastructure. As shown in Fig-
ure 2.1, these entities are distributed in different layers which are important to the
semantic gap problem.
2.3.1 SDN Controller
An SDN controller is a collection of services and sub-systems which manage, con-
figure, and program the entire network from a centralized location. SDN controllers
are required to maintain network states for management and distribution of infor-
mation [23]. Numerous SDN controllers from different vendors are available in the
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market.
In this paper, we primarily target the design issues in two of the most common
open source SDN controllers in the market: OpenDayLight (ODL [22]) and Open
Network Operating System (ONOS [2]). These controllers are the base systems for
many enterprise controllers from vendors such as Brocade, CISCO, and Ericsson.
The information shared or retrieved from controller is of vital interest to secu-
rity research since these are the potential entry points for an attacker to abuse and
compromise the information.
2.3.2 Network, Services and Applications
To communicate with network entities, the SDN controller uses different south-
bound plugins (named after the typical SDN topology representation, where the
switches are below, or “south”, of the controller) which include OpenFlow [21], NET-
CONF [6], BGP, etc. In this paper, we primarily focus on security challenges involved
when the network is programmed using NMDA as the datastore management design,
and OpenFlow as a messaging channel between controller and switches. The payload
of the OpenFlow messages contains sensitive information stored or retrieved from
NMDA-defined datastores and is used to configure and monitor the network. This
approach is taken by ODL and ONOS, and thus inherited by a significant segment of
the SDN market. Clearly, the integrity of the information stored inside datastores is
critical for operation of an SDN network.
An SDN controller is an advanced Network Operating System [22] that involves
critical services like the learning switch, the flow programmer, topology discovery,
etc. Availability of these services that provision information to the users and govern
network operations is critical. For example, a service collects the configuration from
an administrator and stores it in a datastore. A notification daemon notifies a flow
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programming service to pick the new configuration, create OpenFlow messages, and
send the messages to the network devices for the final configuration. A failed or in-
correct operation of any of these participating services will have an immediate impact
on the dependent network functions.
The applications that configure and monitor the network use a separate north-
bound plugins (REST, RPC, CLI, etc.) to communicate with the services running
in controller. Applications like load balancers and software firewall can be located
in logically or physically different locations and do not establish a direct communi-
cation channel with network. Since controller relays an application’s intent to the
network, access control and confidentiality of application’s information are functional
obligations of controller.
2.4 SDN Information Organization
We categorize the data used by SDN controllers into three categories based on
the datastore used (as shown in Figure 2.1) as the specific datastore used influences
security requirements:
2.4.1 Control/Configuration Data
Services and applications store the network configuration inside the NMDA-based
configuration datastore. The configuration stored include flow rules, access control
policies, quality of service criteria, etc. Notification services run as a daemon inside
the controller and periodically check for updates to notify other registered services.
Control information is dynamically accessed and deployed and requires critical re-
sponse times, meaning minimal performance overhead.
9
2.4.2 Inventory/Operational Data
The centralized view of the network (topology, runtime state, traffic statistics),
obtained using southbound plugins, is stored in the NMDA-based operational data-
store. The consistency and accuracy of this information are critical as it reflects
the state of the physical network. For instance, if a firewall application consumes
incorrect topology, its decision to enforce access control is based on incorrect data,
leading to unauthorized communication in the network, thus breaking policy control
and potentially affecting the decisions of load balancing applications in turn.
2.4.3 Management Data
An SDN controller requires all management level of information such as the list
of SDN users, groups, authorization levels, etc. This information is often configured
as part of the initialization process of the controller and is often directly stored in
relational databases.
10
Chapter 3
THREAT MODEL
In our threat model, we consider any communication channel that an external
entity can establish with the controller as a threat. However, we assume that the
channel to communicate with the controller is secure—that is, we assume that the
southbound channel between a controller and the network is encrypted and protected
(using OpenFlow, SSL, TLS, etc.). Similarly, we assume the northbound communi-
cation is secure: connections between applications and the controller (secured REST,
HTTPs, etc).
APP APP APP
Applications to 
datastore
Datastore-1
Service-1 Service-2 Service-3
Inter-service 
communication
Network to datastore
Service to 
datastore
Datastore-2
Figure 3.1: Threat model.
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In this paper we focus on the interactions between entities in SDN which involve
the datastores and the information stored within them. As shown in Figure 3.1, we
investigate three susceptible communication channels during information exchange.
First, the interaction between SDN applications and the SDN controller to install
configurations for the resources operating in the network. Second, the interaction
between network devices and the SDN controller for state management and monitor-
ing. Lastly, the coordination between SDN services, which is an essential aspect of
the SDN controller for operational purposes.
We have identified the following threats that are relevant to our discussion:
Inconsistent Network State. Applications that run on the SDN controller (and
the controller software itself), particularly security-critical applications such as fire-
walls, require a consistent view of the network state. A consistent view of the network
state means that when an application adds a flow rule to the controller, that flow rule
is added to the network. While not every inconsistent network state is a vulnera-
bility, an inconsistent network state can be a very serious security vulnerability (as
we further demonstrate in this paper). For instance, if a firewall application inserts
a flow rule to limit communication between two hosts, if that rule is not actually
implemented in the network (yet the firewall app thinks that it is), then that is a
vulnerable inconsistent network state.
Denial of Service. As the controller is the central “brains” of the SDN network,
it is also the central point of failure. If an adversary is able to cause the controller
to crash, then the entire network is unusable. A controller crash can be caused by
depleting computing, memory, or storage limits.
Other commonly known threat models for SDN (such as those presented in DELTA
[18] and [11]) focus on layers surrounding the controller that exploit the controller’s
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communication channels. However, our model discusses exploiting the datastore de-
sign of SDN controllers. Additionally, we consider that the vulnerabilities which exist
in the SDN-datastores can be exploited in both forced and accidental situations.
In the case of an adversarial threat, an adversary can compromise the security of
the SDN controllers and the network by directly exploiting the inherent weaknesses in
its datastore design. In the absence of an adversary, security issues identified in this
paper can also cause accidental misconfiguration leading to emergent trust violations.
13
Chapter 4
THE SEMANTIC GAP
As described in Section 2.4, the SDN uses several different datastores in which
different types of data are stored. Unfortunately, the underlying specification for
these datastores, as determined by the Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA) [28], lacks two critical considerations. First, it does not propose a way for
applications interacting with one datastore to have guarantees that their information
will actually be synchronized to another datastore, and second, it does not provide
any functionality for the tracking of the ownership of information.
These design drawbacks of NMDA result in a design-level semantic gap in SDN
and manifest in symptoms of both inconsistent network states and to denial of service
attacks. In this section, we discuss the nature of this semantic gap and present a semi-
automated tool that can help in probing for potential vulnerabilities spawning from
it.
4.1 The Problem
Figure 4.1 describes the flow of control and data in an SDN environment. Inside
the controller (middle of Figure 4.1), there are two datastores: one called config-
uration, for the desired network state, and one called operational, for the actual
network state. SDN applications, via the northbound API, communicate network
state changes to the controller, which the controller first places in the configuration
datastore. Controller services then apply these network state changes into the actual
network via the southbound API (commonly, OpenFlow). Later, other services in
the controller request information about the state of the actual network devices to
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update the operational datastore.
As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, we consider three different semantic levels in the SDN
environment: application semantics, controller semantics, and network semantics.
This idea of semantics captures the notion that a request by an application asking
the controller to insert a flow rule has a semantic meaning to that application: It wants
that flow rule inserted in the network so that it can impact allowed communications.
The controller semantics handle the managing of application network change events,
programming of switches, and monitoring of switches. The network semantics define
the actual state of the network switches.
This gap between the layers is the semantic gap problem, and there are three
key causes: (1) information disparity, (2) blurred responsibilities, and (3) unreliable
service chaining.
4.1.1 Information Disparity
In an ideal scenario, when an application issues a network change request, it is
expected that the network will be configured as and when intended. In fact, the
application semantics expect and demand this behavior. If there is a temporal delay
(caused by server load, network load, or adversarial behavior) in the controller issuing
the network change request to the actual network, then this can lead to an inconsistent
network state.
For instance, if the administrator disables a terminated employee’s machine’s net-
work access through the firewall application, and the firewall application asks the
controller to implement the desired flow rule, but the flow rule is delayed or even
dropped, then the firewall application and the administrator have an inconsistent
view of the network state.
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Figure 4.1: Control flow and disparity in information.
4.1.2 Blurred Responsibilities
Another key aspect of the semantic gap problem is the blurred responsibilities
in the datastores. Consider Figure 4.2, which shows a user producing rules. A ser-
vice called the SAL Add-Flow controller module adds these rules to the configuration
datastore. At a later point, the controller’s Flow Programmer module adds the rules
to the switches. Finally, the switch’s rules are queried by the OpenFlow plugin and
stored in the operational datastore. There is a fundamental question at this point:
Who owns the rules? The User, the SAL Add-Flow, the Flow Programmer, or the
OpenFlow plugin? If the rule has a timeout, who is responsible for deleting the rule
after the timeout?
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Figure 4.2: Ownership issues (mixed patterns show conflicts).
The implications of blurred responsibility lead to either the subsequent tasks being
done twice or not being done at all. The former poses performance issues when one
or more applications perform repetitive tasks. The latter has serious implications as
it leads to lack of action and an inconsistent network state.
Additionally, such faulty or unintended configuration can have cascading affects
on the network. Hong et al. [12] poison the topology information and demonstrate its
global impact on network and functionality of other applications. As we demonstrate
in this paper, most of the controllers in the market leverage this design and are prone
to inconsistent network states (whether forced or accidental).
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4.1.3 Unreliable Service Chaining
When an application requests a network change, there are several SDN services
that act on that request, and the application expects and requires that all the services
act on the request in the intended order. In a similar fashion, if an application requests
a series of network changes in order, they expect those changes to act in that order.
However, the datastores fundamentally lack synchronization measures for ensuring a
chained sequence of actions, which can cause an inconsistent network state.
In fact, Xu et al. [32] showed that logic flaws (race conditions) in applications
developed for SDN controllers can be exploited from a remote location and can lead
to a compromised network as a result of unreliable service chaining. We argue that
race conditions in SDN applications is one symptom of the underlying unreliable
service chaining problem.
4.2 Probing the Semantic Gap
As mentioned Section 3, datastore-based vulnerabilities can be exploited in both
forced or accidental situations to trigger either an inconsistent network state or denial
of service. To automatically identify possible datastore-based vulnerabilities, we de-
signed a systematic procedure to exploit the semantic gap problem and implemented
it into a tool.
4.2.1 Threat Detection Methodology
We propose a systematic SDN-fuzzer to perform black-box fuzzing of mainstream
SDN controllers: OpenDayLight and Open Network Operating System. Unlike exist-
ing work [31, 33], we do not attempt to impact the performance of the controller by
merely flooding it with random traffic. Instead, we acquire a list of critical services
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involving datastores, analyze them to expose their entry points, and selectively target
the datastores by fuzzing the communication channels described as part of our threat
model (Section 3).
The fuzzer is provided with a list of services to be inspected. It iteratively detects
the interfaces exposed by each service by checking the response header of the RESTful
requests (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, UPDATE) made to the service. If a response
such as ”HTTP-405: Method Not Allowed” is received, it is inferred that service has
disabled certain operations. This response is crucial for the fuzzer as it is consumed
to infer the kind of datastore (configuration/operational) the service uses.
According to the NMDA rule, the operational datastore cannot be configured (no
POST, DELETE, etc.) from the northbound applications but can be read (GET) by
all authorized applications. Conversely, the configuration datastore can be both read
and modified by all applications. As an example, a flow statistics service provides
dynamic updates of network traffic and thus sends back the information stored in
the operational (state) datastore. Because this information is stored only in the
operational datastore, a GET request to a configuration datastore for statistics will
result in a HTTP-405 error. Similarly, when a PUSH request for the flow programmer
service is made for a configuration datastore, a success HTTP-200 message is received.
However, the same request for the operational datastore will result in a HTTP-405
error, and it is inferred that the service does not involve the operational datastore
and is used only for configurational purposes.
In Table 4.1, we list the critical responses which the fuzzer receives from the
services in the SDN controller and the inference that is derived. The fuzzer incorpo-
rates an input generator engine, which automatically creates inputs in the supported
format (e.g., JSON) and issues HTTP requests to the given URL.
The response returned is interpreted and analyzed by the analysis engine. Finally,
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Table 4.1: HTTP response codes and inference.
Code Response reason Inference
200 Request successful Datastore found
401 Unauthorized Wrong credentials
404 Not found Datastore not supported
405 Method not allowed Datastore with limited features
429 Too many requests Rate limiting measures present
500 Internal server error Exceptions, crashes, errors
503 Service unavailable Latency and deadlocks
507 Insufficient storage Resource crunch
for successful responses (HTTP-200 ), the fuzzer checks the state of the network to
confirm the consistency of the network as was intended from the configuration.
If a mismatch between the applied configuration and expected configuration is
detected, this is a inconsistent network state.
To identify the root cause, we manually examine the container logs and attempt to
reproduce the problem. We also rerun the tests for inputs that cause misconfiguration
in the system to determine the persistence and impact of the problem. Recoverable
crashes (change of HTTP code from 500 to 200) are considered less harmful than the
irrecoverable shutdown of services. Similarly, runtime exceptions are considered less
fatal than a crash.
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Chapter 5
IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we evaluate SDN-fuzzer and present our results based on the se-
curity properties and the vulnerability classes that were exploited during the experi-
ments on mainstream SDN controllers. Our experimental setup consisted of the SDN
controllers (ODL [25] and ONOS [24]), a real network (university datacenter), a sim-
ulated network (mininet [30]), and the fuzzer. The SDN controllers had roughly 724
installed services (features), and we actively tracked the impact of fuzzing on 77 crit-
ical services. Core services which were impacted are mentioned in Table 5.2. The
extent of these attacks in different platforms which implement the NMDA datastore
design manifesting in its vulnerabilities is shown in Table 6.1.
5.1 Attacks on Availability
In SDN controllers, the semantic gap problems discussed in Section 4.1 aggravate
the central-point of failure of SDN by exposing security vulnerabilities which impact
Table 5.1: Summary of service disruptions while configuring operational network.
No. of rules Time
Tracked services
(total - 724)
Impact on Services
Attacks Overall impact
Exception Crash Dead Recovered
25 (default) 0 77 0 0 0 0 AT-1 None
20000 25 77 4 1 0 4 AT-1, AT-2.1 Low
38400 50 68 10 3 2 (deadlock) 8
AT-1, AT2.1,
AT-2.2, AT-3
Latency surge
54000 75 61 10 5 2 (deadlock) 2
AT-1, AT2.1,
AT-2.2, AT-3
High (service failure)
60000 100 0 (system crash) 14 7 Unknown Uknown
AT2.1, AT-2.2,
AT-2.3
Severe
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the availability of a network.
The performance of the SDN controller can be impacted in two ways depending
on the threat source and the attack surface:
• Northbound attack : As per the threat model (Section 3), the northbound com-
munication with the SDN controller is for programming or monitoring the net-
work which requires applications to store the configuration in the datastores.
Unchecked storage and improper management of the stored information can
lead to memory overflows and impact the controllers’ availability.
• Southbound attack : The forwarding plane can generate events not triggered by
the controller (e.g., host and switch migration, switch reboots, or manual device
configuration) which are updated in the operational datastore. This leads to
performance overhead in the southbound channel and consumption of memory
resources of the controller.
For the communications that happen at the northbound API, both read and write
controls for the configuration datastore are exposed to applications. Also, as described
in Section 4.1.2, there is a blurred sense of ownership of the configuration stored in the
configuration datastore. This arrangement means that services/applications inside
the controller do not have the responsibility to clean and manage the configuration
after use, and they depend on someone else to do it. As part of our experiments, we
leveraged an application with RESTful privileges to install configuration (flow rules)
in the SDN controllers which support the datastore model. There is no threshold or
limit of flows that an application can install. Also, the SDN controllers will always
accept a new configuration.
AT-1 (Northbound channel overflow): We installed applications and at-
tacked the services in a distributed fashion to evade detection. If an application
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is allowed to send unchecked amounts of configuration, it impacts the overall la-
tency to serve similar requests and at some point in time causes service unavailability
(HTTP-503 ). We validated the latency impact on RESTful configurations on an
SDN controller with two different hardware capabilities as shown in Figure 5.1. At
the time of this writing, no SDN controllers had implemented preventive measures to
implement rate limiting as shown in Table 6.1.
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Figure 5.1: Flooding attack on configuration datastores.
AT-2 (Persistence): In our experiments using mutated flows to fuzz the config-
uration datastore, we discovered issues with management of stored information. We
found that the configuration (active or inactive) persists for an indefinite amount of
time inside the configuration datastore. The results of these experiments are elabo-
rated in Table 5.1. Due to blurred responsibility, the expired configuration (flow rules
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with timeouts) is never deleted by services running inside the controller even after
the expiration of timeout values. The communicating entity outside of the controller
believes that the timeout value has a purpose which will be respected—the configura-
tion will be cleared from the network (and operational datastore) and the controller
(configuration datastore).
AT-2.1 (Service crash): Before we could notice an impact on the availability of
the controller, critical services (eg., flow programmer) of both ODL and ONOS were
impacted as shown in Table 5.2. The repeated experiments on ODL are shown in
Table 5.1, the tracked services faced deadlock, exceptions and crash. Some of these
services could recover, other services (eg., clustering and UI) remained dead.
AT-2.2 (Southbound latency surge): As the amount of flows stored in the
datastore kept increasing, the time required for services to query valid flows (flow
programmer) and push them to network degraded. Surge in latency to learn the
events from the network had a logical impact on dependent services.
AT-2.3 (Controller shutdown): The blurred responsibility leads to information
to accumulate within the controller. SDN controllers such as OpenDayLight, which
run inside a Java virtual environment, depend on the configured JVM memory. If an
application is allowed to send unchecked amount of configurations, theoretically, every
controller will run out of memory eventually. The MD-SAL service which is a kernel
of the OpenDayLight controller ran out of memory to maintain the running state of
the controller and eventually crashed causing the shutdown as shown in Figure 5.1b
(error message shown in Listing 5.1c).
AT-3 (Unused Configuration): The NMDA design allows SDN controllers to
store the configuration for nodes which are absent from the network. SDN-fuzzer
could install configurations for switches that were not active in the network.Although
this is as per the design requirement of NMDA [28], the feature gives an advan-
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Table 5.2: Impacted services and datastores in ODL and ONOS (C: configuration,
O: operation, M: management).
Controller Service Datastore Result
ODL
LearningSwitch O event miss
TopologyManager C/O exceptions
HostTracker O event miss
DLUX UI C/O deadlock
MD-SAL (core) C/O/M crash
SwitchManager O posioned
RESTCONF C/O latency
SALFlowManager C/O misconfig
ONOS
SwitchManager O poisoned
FlowAnalyzer C/O event miss
ReactiveForwarder C misconfig
LinkManager C/O latency
HostMobility O event miss
tage to the attacker to degrade the performance of the controller without impacting
the network and successfully hiding the malicious behavior by the traffic monitoring
service.
5.2 Attacks on Integrity
Most of the information that is placed into the configuration datastore is for
programming the network, therefore manipulating the configuration datastore infor-
mation leads to a direct impact on the network. The consistency and accuracy of
the information that is stored in the datastores and passed to the network can be
manipulated using two communication channels with SDN controller:
• Northbound attack : Applications and users install configuration in the config-
uration datastore, which are later propagated to the network. The details of
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Figure 5.2: Configuration poisoning attack.
how and when this information is propagated are security-critical. If the con-
figuration is installed in the network at the time not primarily intended by
the administrator, unauthorized and undesired traffic may be allowed in the
network.
• Southbound attack : Services in the SDN controller register listeners for events
that happen in the forwarding plane. Changes are updated in the operational
store which trigger desired (or spoofed) actions from the registered services.
AT-4 (Advance Persistent Threat): As illustrated in Figure 5.2, we base
the APT attack on the design flaw to retain information even after its expiration.
As part of the root cause analysis of detected policy conflict, we discovered that
one of the switches in our network had dropped off of the network, then re-spawned
automatically as the TCP/IP connection channel between the switch and controller
was reestablished. When the flow programmer service inside the controller detects
such an event, it checks where there is existing configuration data for the new node.
Because the service find a stored configuration for the node in the configuration
datastore, it was restored as part of a process called node reconciliation. With this
process, the otherwise-expired configuration was re-installed in the network as part
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Figure 5.3: OpenFlow rule format.
of reconciliation, and its time-to-live was reset to the originally-configured amount as
opposed to the amount it was at when the switch disconnected.
We regularly monitored the traffic against the policies defined by the fuzzer and
found that the communication that was intended to take place in the past had sud-
denly started again.
This attack is carried out as follows: 1 A switch initiates a connection with the
controller and is configured with the default forwarding rules. 2 An application
installs the network flow configurations with timeouts. 3 The flow programmer
service installs this configuration because it does not cause any direct policy violation.
2 The application persistently installs similar configurations in the network for the
switches which physically exist in the network. 5 At any point in the future when
there is a switch reconnection procedure (forced [20, 18] or natural), 6 the existing
configuration (which includes the expired configuration) will be installed in the switch.
Since the configuration datastore holds the original (configuration-level time-to-
live, rather than the actual remaining operation-level one, the TTL was reset to its full
value. In effect, this allows flow rules in the network to persist beyond their original
expiration time, thus allowing communication between hosts that should otherwise
be unable to communicate.
Interestingly, switch disconnections from the controller can be natural or forced.
For example, forced disconnections can be initiated by attacking the network time
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protocol (NTP) [20, 18], or through the triggering of DoS vulnerabilities in a switch
itself. This means that in addition to being caused by accidental switch disconnec-
tions, this issue can be triggered by an adversarial agent to retain access to network
resources that should otherwise time out.
AT-4.1 (Switch Table Overflow): SDN controllers are required to store the
entire network’s configuration and therefore may possess massive storage capacity.
However, OpenFlow switches have limited storage capacity, and as part of the recon-
nection procedure, when a switch’s flow tables receive too many flow rules (everything
since the beginning of time), the flow table’s upper bound can be easily reached, and
a table overflow attack is eventually realized.
AT-4.2 (Infinite Access): Since the flawed reconciliation process installs config-
uration data which is not necessarily intended at the time of installation, an OpenFlow
switch being reconciled may allow unintended traffic or block allowed traffic. When
this attack is carefully crafted, an application needs to configure the network just
once and then force the controller to configure the switch in a loop 5 – 6 – 5 .
The reconnection workflow is initiated at a regular interval, just before the rule
expiry (when timeout in Figure 5.3 is expiring). Thus, the switch always retains the
rule for the ongoing (malicious) flow. This circumvents the OpenFlow policy (switch
should send the first packet of an unknown flow to the controller for taking decision)
and allows the traffic between two hosts in the network for an indefinite period.
As shown in Figure 5.2, both switch and hosts can be potential trigger zones for
these attacks.
AT-4.3 (QoS Poisoning): OpenFlow rules support metering and statistics (as a
field in Figure 5.3) for network monitoring and Quality of Service (QoS) purposes. A
side-effect of AT-4 is the potential to poison these statistics. As shown in Figure 5.4b,
a reset (expired) flow rule resets not only the timers (used in AT-4.2) but also the
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Table 5.3: Attack analysis.
Attack Origin
Impacted
datastore
Affected
assets
CIA Attack
duration
Privileges
required
Attack
complexity
Severity
Detection
risk
Scope Status
C I A
AT-1 APP C
flow-manager
north channel
controller-core
× × X short M L H M H reported
AT-2
2.1 APP C general impact × X X long L L M L M CVE1, CVE2
2.2 APP / NW C south channel × × X long L L L L H reported
2.3 APP / NW C/O/M controller-core × X X long L M H M H CVE1
AT-3 APP C/M config datastore × × X long M H L L M reported
AT-4
4.1 APP/NW C/O nw-hardware × × X long L/M M M H H CVE2
4.2 APP/NW C/O firewall X X × moderate L/M H H L H CVE2, in-progress
4.3 APP/NW C/O load-balancer × X X moderate L/M H L L M in-progress
AT-5 APP/NW O host-tracker X X × long L H L M H on-hold
AT-6 APP M AAA, ACL X × × short L L H L L CVE3
CVEs: (1: DoS, 2: APT, 3: credentials); Risk measurement metrics: (L: low, M: medium, H: high)
counters that are assigned to each flow rule. For example, a flow rule with timeout
25 seconds is installed in a switch to allow communication between two connected
hosts (10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2). After the benign communication is completed, a reset of the
expired flow rule (via switch reconciliation) leads to reset of the timers and counters.
At this point, unauthorized traffic is allowed in the network for the additional 25
seconds (shown red in Figure 5.4a), overwriting the values with the statistics of the
flow.
In this attack, when a QoS service (for eg., a load balancer) polls for the flow statis-
tics, the information collected from the network is misleading which will influence its
further decisions.
AT-5 (Unsolicited Configuration): As mentioned in AT-3, the NMDA datas-
tore architecture allows the applications to store the configuration for nodes and en-
tities not present in the network. Present implementations of this otherwise-essential
feature lack security consideration. The present datastore in OpenDayLight lacks the
capability for the user to specify when the timer for the flow rules (Figure 5.3) stored
in the configuration datastore should actually begin. Such issues are primarily due to
no sense of state or time maintenance in the configuration datastore. The operational
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datastore simply stores the current operational state of the network. The future of the
present configuration for the absent nodes remain unclear and thus leads to security
issues in the network in the event of a previously-configured node joins the network.
5.3 Attacks on Confidentiality
As described in Section 2.4, the management information of the SDN controller is
stored in a datastore which is different from those defined by the NMDA (configuration
and state). The design flaws present in the configuration and state datastores may not
appear in the management datastore. Therefore, we undertake a different approach
to detect security issues with the storage and access of management information.
Unlike the previously-mentioned vulnerabilities, the attacks on management data
primarily originate from the northbound channel. This is because events and updates
in the forwarding plane do not have impact on the information stored in management
datastore.
AT-6 (Cache invalidation): In our testing we observed that OpenDayLight
controller failed to delete the cache after an update of the users’ credentials. Thus,
even after modifying the controller’s management credentials, the old credentials still
could be used to authenticate users and north-bound applications. This leads to
privilege escalation and spoofed authentication by anyone, allowing an attacker full
access to controller’s services and stored information.
5.4 Impact Analysis
From our investigation we observe that there are inherent vulnerabilities stem-
ming from the semantic gap problem in the datastore design adopted by SDN. The
attacks described in this work invalidates the claim by RFC-8342 (NDMA) [28] which
mentions that the datastore design does not have any security impact on the network
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being managed.
In Table 5.3, we capture the principal characteristics of the vulnerabilities and
attacks reported in this paper. We analyze the risks with respect to the ease of
execution, required privileges and the duration of a successful exploit. Additionally,
we evaluate the threats against the possibility of detection and also the extent of the
problem in diverse SDN-based platforms. With this, we derive an overall view of the
prevailing issues in SDN that stem from the problem of semantic gap.
AT-1 takes an advantage of limited resources in SDN controller which is also a
central point of failure (controller) and can be triggered by one malicious application
as also shown in [19]. When an attacker crashes the SDN controller, applications
cannot configure the network and control over the network is entirely lost (denial of
service).
AT-2 and AT-3 are covert threats targeted on impacting the availability of SDN
controller. Unlike AT-1, an attacker in AT-2 and AT-3 does not require one continuous
attempt at the target (which increases the probability of evading detection). The
attack in AT-1 requires large amount of configurational updates to be made in a
short duration. However, in the case of AT-2 and AT-3, the attack can be spread out
for a considerably longer duration (even months).
The size of configuration updates in AT-2 and AT-3 does not have a lower bound,
making detection difficult. When performed in a distributed manner over a long
period, these attacks make it difficult to perform root cause analysis: small amounts
of updates from a large number of clients over a long duration increases the entropy
of attack footprint.
The attacks under AT-4 leverage the idea and techniques of flow table attack when
an attack originates from the network (adversarial hosts). For attacks originating
from the southbound channel, there exist work on the detection of flow table flooding
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attacks [33, 31]. However, an attacker in our scenario does not primarily target the
switch’s flow tables. The attacker’s interest lies in the intermediate impact that a flow
table attack has on the controller (and datastores). The performance of the controller
can be impacted in such a situation even if the flow table attack was not successful.
We also analyzed the capabilities that adversary gains when a forwarding element
(e.g., a switch) is already compromised. SDN security is often analyzed from the
scenario of an attacker being able to compromise a switch on the network and attack
the controller-switch channel. These attacks are widely popular and therefore, the
counter measures are readily available. For example, switch table overflow can be
mitigated [33] and a SYN-Flood attack can be prevented using [31]. However, the
attacks that we describe don’t need to flood the communication channel, but rather
target the datastore, evading detection from existing techniques.
Lastly, because we do not focus on the vulnerabilities in applications that run
inside SDN controllers, our attacks are agnostic to any specific implementation of
controller. Therefore, the design flaws highlighted in this work are not limited in
nature to ODL and ONOS and their users. As shown in Table 6.1, they also impact
SDN controllers and cloud management systems—using NMDA design—by enter-
prises such as RedHat, Cisco, Brocade, IBM, Ericsson, Extreme Networks, Huawei,
etc.
5.5 Responsible Disclosure
We demonstrated the importance of the discovered vulnerabilities by verifying
them in different carrier-grade controllers (ODL, ONOS). The organizations involved
in the design and development of these platforms verified the feasibility and impact
of the attacks that we reported. Additionally, in conjunction with the organiza-
tions, we responsibly disclosed some of the vulnerabilities, and were assigned CVEs:
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CVE-2017-1000411 (DoS), CVE-2018-1078 (Advance Persistent Threat), CVE-2017-
1000406 (cached credentials) 1 . We are actively working with engineers to identify
the root cause of some other attacks which are not publicly disclosed yet, including
one confirmed issue on the ONOS bug tracker: ONOS-7456 2 .
1Note, searching for these CVEs will compromise our anonymity.
2Note, this issue is not publicly available as it concerns an open security vulnerability.
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(a) Packets and payload statistics for benign and malicious traffic.
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(b) Reseting of rule and poisoning of statistics.
Figure 5.4: Poisoned statistics during rule reset.
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Chapter 6
BRIDGING THE SEMANTIC GAP
Table 6.1: Summary of impacted SDN platforms and enterprises.
Platform Base design Vendor Management Open Source Impact
OpenDayLight (ODL) - Linux-NF NETCONF / NMDA X AT-(1,2,3,4,5,6)
Open Network OS (ONOS) - Linux-NF NETCONF / NMDA X AT-(1,3,4,5)
Cisco Open-SDN ODL Cisco Systems NETCONF / NMDA × AT-(1,2,3,4,5,6)
Contrail / OpenContrail - Juniper OPENSTACK X×
Lumina SDN ODL Lumina NETCONF / NMDA × AT-(1,2,3,4,5,6)
Ericsson Cloud SDN ODL / OpenStack Ericsson NETCONF / NMDA X× AT-(1,2,3,4,5,6)
Huawei Agile ODL / ONOS Huawei NETCONF / NMDA × AT-(1,2,3,4,5)
Big Cloud Fabric (BCF) FloodLight Big Switch Networks OF × AT-(1,2,3,4,5)
HP VAN Controller - HP - × -
Cisco APIC - Cisco Systems OF / NETCONF X AT-(2,4)
Open Networking Platform ODL Inocybe NETCONF / NMDA × AT-(1,2,3,4,5,6)
AT&T Integrated Cloud (AIC) Juniper AT&T OF / OPENSTACK × AT-1
ZENIC vDC Controller OpenStack ZTE Corporation OPENSTACK × AT-1
Through our assistance to the engineers responsible for the SDN controllers im-
pacted by our identified vulnerabilities, we have identified several approaches can be
incorporated to prevent at least some of the attacks mentioned in this paper. The
mitigation measures can be employed at several different layers of the SDN design.
However, as the underlying issue lies in the NMDA design, each mitigation has draw-
backs.
6.1 External applications
To prevent the overflow of data, we propose to use a mechanism to limit the
amount of configuration that an application can install. One can use a rate limiting
proxy at the API level to monitor the REST channel for any suspicious amount of
traffic. For strengthening the security of the management data, the management
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APIs within SDN controller should only ever be deployed within a segregated private
network
6.2 Mitigating denial of service
Preventive measures should be placed at the controller level as the applications
are consumers of the services provided by the controller. Therefore, we propose
to set the percentage of heap utilization for the resources and datastores inside the
controller. This threshold can be defined as part of the modeling scheme (YANG) used
by services inside the controller. Based on the dynamic statistics of heap utilization,
the resources within the controller can be dynamically scaled. After reaching the
threshold of utilization, the application can no longer install the configuration and
server will respond accordingly.
Lack of systematic synchronizations between configuration and operational datas-
tores is a major downside in the present design. The expired configuration persists in
the configuration datastore only because the datastore is oblivious to the state of the
configuration in the network. It will be a huge performance overhead if an application
must continuously (every millisecond) probe the state of the network in the opera-
tional datastore. Instead, we propose to introduce a system clock in the datastores.
An application can easily know the state of the configuration with respect to time if
every configuration in the datastore has a time variable associated with it along with
other model defined headers. This way when the configuration expires (system clock
vs timeout value), it can be pruned from the datastore by an automatic garbage col-
lector. This also provides the information of the remaining time for the configuration,
which is important in the case of resetting the last known configuration to avoid the
reset of timers to zero.
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6.3 Mitigating misconfigurations
Largely, there are two ways an incorrect configuration can be introduced into the
network. First, when an application’s configuration is poisoned by another application
or service. This is not a datastore-specific issue and can be handled by the application
logic by implementing a better threat model and strengthening the control over the
information.
Second, when the two primary datastores inside the SDN controller are not in
sync and therefore the configuration datastore is misconfigured. A reconciliation in
the network should be done using the last known information of the node being
reconciled. When the configuration datastore is picked for reconciliation, the state
that will be reconfigured cannot be trusted as it might have partial life remaining or
it might be expired altogether.
The application which installed the configuration in the configuration datastore
should implement listeners to the updates in the operational datastore. Upon events,
a snapshot of the operational datastore (last known state) should be updated in the
configuration datastore.
As mentioned in earlier mitigation, implementing a probing (or syncing) mech-
anism is not a good approach as it introduces a lot of overhead. This also can be
prevented using a system clock tied with the configuration. When the configuration
is pulled from the datastore, the clock can be verified with the timeout values. This
way a flow reconciliation manager inside of SDN controller can understand that a
flow is already expired and should not be pushed to the network.
During an event of removing the data tree for the nodes removed from the net-
work, before updating the network state in the operational datastore, a snapshot of
the most-recent running configuration should be updated in the configuration data-
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store. Upon reconciliation, the data which will be reconciled from the configuration
datastore will not be the initial configuration of the node but the most recent con-
figuration itself. Such a preventive measure does not break the programming model
either (two or more applications modifying the same data).
The OpenFlow plugin, which installs the configuration for an application into the
network, breaks the programming model only when it modifies the configuration (two
or more entities not sharing application context). However, with the configurational
clock, the plugin can simply ignore the data. This leaves the responsibility of deletion
of the information with the application or the rightful owner.
6.4 Tracking ownership
We propose to introduce metadata with the configuration to mitigate the issue of
conflicting ownership of the configuration stored in the datastore. The metadata can
be included as a configurational element provided to the subscribers of the service.
An application configuring the network, when implementing a configuration, owns
the data and the ownership in the configuration is automatically assigned. Similarly,
when the information is moved within the controller without any external world’s
interaction, the metadata will be updated with the producer of the configuration. This
also solves the problem when no participating entity is willing to take the ownership
of the data.
This is the closest to a design-level change, and the drawback of this mitigation is
that it will require modifications to any SDN component that produces data. Thus,
the implementation of this mitigation represents a significant undertaking.
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Chapter 7
DISCUSSION
SDN suffers from vulnerabilities that are specific to the new design and architec-
ture of network management systems. The attacks (what we discussed in this paper)
violate key security principles of cloud-based systems (eg., SDN) and do not neces-
sarily have a similar impact on a traditional network systems. On the contrary, well
studied network attacks (e.g., IP/MAC spoofing, DoS) can be crafted differently in
SDN, making present defense measures obsolete. Therefore, an evolving architecture
like SDN demands a security reanalysis of its components and the adopted design.
Being a hot topic of Internet and datacenters, SDN is actively researched by
academia and industry. Although security in SDN is not an ignored subject anymore,
the architectural weaknesses are still unexplored which subside the merits of the SDN
powerhouse. Prior work have found vulnerabilities in implementations of the SDN
services [12, 35] and underlying threats in channels connecting to the controller [34].
A ground zero analysis of the existing issues would have exposed the platform-agnostic
design-level problems discussed in this paper. However, researchers have focused on
finding more such issues in the implementations which limits the scope of the work
to the specifically studied systems (SDN controllers).
As SDN is changing the world, a robust and reliable backbone (design) becomes
a principal requirement. However, there exists minimal or no security analysis of
management, transfer, and use of the information stored inside SDN controllers. The
datastore standard defined in RFC-8342 [28], acknowledges the disparity of informa-
tion across datastores but lacks security analysis. It fails to identify the information
disparity as a security problem: as part of security considerations, it mentions that the
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design has “no security impact” on the network. In this work, we identify weaknesses
in the design which lead to serious security impact on the network.
The vendors which implement the NMDA design trust the standard for what it
mentions about the inherent security. Therefore, organizations tend to focus only on
improving the scalable and modular attributes of SDN. Security considerations are ig-
nored during the modeling and development of these controllers and are worked upon
only when researchers highlight serious security problems. This became increasingly
apparent in our research and involvement with these organizations. Many enterprise
SDN controllers are based on open-sourced systems and also contribute to their de-
velopment. Therefore, the security issues discussed in this work spread to a breadth
of cloud-based platforms as shown in Table 6.1.
To continue to harness the benefits of SDN, it is important to ensure that the
identified security risks are attended. Merely acknowledging the security problems
and delaying to address them may not be a fruitful approach in the long run. Likewise,
providing workarounds to contain a specific threat is a costly approach as it does not
guarantee a solution or a threat-free SDN controller. To this extent, a re-design of
the datastore management system might be costly at the moment but can be deemed
necessary, profitable and a more secured approach for safeguarding the future.
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Chapter 8
RELATED WORK
In this section, we analyze the security research done in network management
systems and discuss the relevant attack classes of SDN.
Security Research in Network Management
Network management system has been continuously studied and improved since the
inception of the Internet. SNMPv1 [4] suffered many performance and security issues
which were only partially addressed by SNMPv2 [7] (with community-based security)
and fully addressed with SNMPv3 [8] which encrypted the traffic and detected mal-
formed packets. However, based on Management Information Base (MIB), SNMP
appears as a costly alternative to manage advancing networks.
The modern protocols such as NETCONF [6] and OpenFlow [21] receive research
attention from the security community. RFC-5539 [10] and RFC-4742 [9] propose
to use Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Shell (SSH) channel to secure
exchanges used in the protocol. Similarly, OpenFlow is actively researched for im-
provements against spoofing, packet tampering, denial of service, and side channel
attacks as surveyed in [17, 27]. However, much of the research focus has been in secur-
ing the channel of communication and, consequently, secured mechanisms to manage
critical information within the controller have not been addressed.
Kim and Feamster [16] have attempted to realize the criticality of robust network
management. However, the work is limited to leveraging the merits of SDN (abstrac-
tion and centralized control) to improve the conventional management techniques and
handle a deluge of network events. Kim and Feamster did not investigate the security
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impact of a poorly designed management system over the entire network and other
services.
SDN Attacks and Defense Frameworks
SDN is hot topic of network security research with noteworthy work done to address
the weaknesses in protecting the availability and integrity of the network. Various
frameworks exist to attack and identify threats in SDN and its abstracted planes.
Most recently, DELTA [18] re-instantiated and combined the attacking mechanisms
defined in earlier work in a platform agnostic tool (opensourced) and added protocol-
aware fuzzing mechanism to discover vulnerabilities. Although DELTA succeeded
in discovering 27 security threats in diverse SDN environments, its black-box fuzzer
could only target the communication channels with the controller (northbound and
southbound). To discover the vulnerabilities within the controller, the fuzzer cannot
identify a datastore from the behavior of the service being fuzzed. Therefore, DELTA
cannot detect the security issues that surface from the NMDA design (incorporated
by most of the controllers that it is tested against). We were motivated by the design
of DELTA’s fuzzer to create the randomization in the flow entries to fuzz the target
service after identifying its datastore as mentioned in Section 4.2.
Flow Wars [35] presents a consolidated report on the the current attack surfaces
and threats in SDN and showcases common design and implementation pitfalls that
allow the abuse of SDN networks. However, since no earlier work has attempted to
attack the SDN datastores, potential issues in the NMDA design (a critical aspect of
the most SDN controllers) are missed as part of its findings.
Other attacks target specific network functions in SDN: Dhawan et al. [5] detect
policy violations in the forwarding plane but does not take into account the impact on
controller and its services, Lee et al. [19] elaborate on attacks induced from seemingly
42
benign applications against implementation flaws in other SDN applications.
Xu et al. [32] target the novel TOCTOU attacks against SDN. Similar to our
work, the authors propose a framework in which forced or natural race conditions in
the event-driven system create chaos in the network and ultimately lead to breach
of trust boundaries. The framework, however, is not agnostic: an attacker requires
implementation knowledge and expertise to carefully craft an attack inducing race
condition.
Potential defense mechanisms against threats in SDN are proposed in NOSAr-
mor [14] and Avant-guard [29]. As mentioned in Section 5.4, these systems provide
defenses only against the known attacks in SDN. The attacks mentioned in this paper
will go undetected as they endure a covert execution pattern and do not necessarily
depend on the abuse of communication channels with controller. Upon integrating
these unknown attack classes with subverting mechanisms such as SDN Rootkits [26],
an adversary, outside of the controller can successfully evade detection and launch an
advanced persistent threat to manipulate the network.
Denial of Service and Poisoning Attacks in SDN
Various works study the impact of availability and integrity of SDN network through
denial of service and poisoning attacks. DoS attacks commonly originate from the
SDN data plane and target either the forwarding element (switch) by flooding the
local flow tables [33, 31] or impacting the availability of controller by flooding the
south bound channel between the controller and network [34].
However, the threat model incorporated by the frameworks to detect the DoS
attacks primarily concentrate on detecting the abnormal surge in the traffic being
handled by the controller. That is, the focus is placed on identifying the saturation of
communication channels. Design problems that lead to resource consumption within
43
SDN datastores, as we discuss in this paper, are not explored yet.
To impact the integrity of the information stored within the controller, TopoGuard
[12] aims to detect poisoning attacks. TopoGuard takes advantage of poor implemen-
tation and coordination of services (host tracking, topology) within enterprise SDN
controllers to spoof the controller’s view of the infrastructure and impacting the deci-
sion of other dependent services. The paper highlights the impact that vulnerabilities
in one service can have over the entire network. However, the root cause analysis of
the detected issue is not discussed in the work. Therefore, in this work, we focus on
the root cause for various controller-level violation of trust boundaries.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
In this work, we perform a first-of-its-kind security analysis of the NMDA-defined
datastores as implemented by carrier-grade SDN controllers. We identify new vul-
nerabilities that stem from a semantic gap problem between different abstractions
as part of the network and the datastore design. We present new attacks on SDN
that leverage the semantic gap and compromise the controller’s performance, force
misconfigurations in the network, cause races in the control flow of core services in the
controller, and finally disrupt the critical functionalities of SDN ultimately leading
to the crash of the SDN controller. We demonstrate the proof and impact of these
vulnerabilities by attacking enterprise SDN controllers (ODL and ONOS) and later
working with the concerned organizations to formulate defensive measures.
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